ພຣະນາຄາຣະຊຸນ Nagarjuna
ປະຫວັດ
ອີງຕາມປະຫວັດທີ່ແປຈາກພາສາຈີນໂດຍພຣະກຸມາຣະຊີວະ (Kumarajiva) ເມື່ອປະມານ ຄ.ສ. 405 ໄດ້ກ່າວວ່າ: ພຣະນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ ແມ່ນຊາວອິນເດຍໃຕ້ ເກີດໃນຕະກູນພຣາມ. ແຕ່ຂໍ້ມູນທີ່ບັນທຶກໂດຍພຣະຖັງຊຳຈັ໋ງ (Xuanzang) ລະບຸວ່າ ທ່ານເກີດໃນແຄ້ວນໂກສົນພາກໃຕ້ ແລະ ເປັນພຣະສະຫາຍທີ່ມີອາຍຸໄລ່ເລ່ຍກັບພຣະເຈົ້າຍັດຊະຍະສີ ເຄົາມີບຸດ (Yajña Śrī Gautamīputra, ຄ.ສ. 166-196).
ປະຫວັດໃນຕອນຕົ້ນແມ່ນຍັງບໍ່ມີຄວາມຊັດເຈນ, ຫຼັກຖານຂອງທິເບດກ່າວວ່າ ທ່ານໄດ້ອອກບວດຕັ້ງແຕ່ຍັງນ້ອຍ ຍ້ອນມີຜູ້ທຳນາຍວ່າຈະມີອາຍຸສັ້ນ. ບາງແຫຼ່ງກໍວ່າ ມານດາຂອງທ່ານໄດ້ຮັບຄຳທຳນາຍວ່າ ທ່ານນາກາຣະຊຸນນະຈະບໍ່ສາມາດມີບຸດໄດ້, ທາງແກ້ຄືຕ້ອງຈັດພິທີລ້ຽງພຣາມ 100 ຄົນ. ຄອບຄົວຂອງທ່ານຈຶ່ງໄດ້ຈັດພິທີດັ່ງກ່າວ ແຕ່ຫຼັງຈາກນັ້ນ ພຣາມກໍຍັງທຳນາຍວ່າຕ້ອງຈັດພິທີນີ້ອີກ ຍ້ອນຍັງບໍ່ສິ້ນເຄາະ. ຈົນກະທັ້ງຫຼັງຈາກທີ່ມານດາໄດ້ເຮັດພິທີລ້ຽງພຣາມເປັນຄັ້ງທີສາມ, ມານດາຈຶ່ງຕັດສິນໃຈໃຫ້ທ່ານອອກບວດໃນຂະນະທີ່ອາຍຸຍັງບໍ່ຄົບ 7 ປີ ແລະ ໃຫ້ທ່ານອອກຈາຣິກສະແຫວງບຸນ ເພື່ອສະແຫວງຫາຜູ້ທີ່ສາມາດຊ່ວຍຊີວິດໃຫ້ລອດພົ້ນຈາກຄວາມຕາຍ. ທ່ານໄດ້ຈາຣິກມາຈົນຮອດນາລັນທາ ແລະ ໄດ້ພົບກັບທ່ານຣາຫຸນພັດທະຣະ (Rahulabhadra) ແລ້ວໄດ້ຮັບການສຶກສາຢູ່ທີ່ນັ້ນ.
ຕຳນານອື່ນໆ
ແຕ່ອີກຕຳນານໜຶ່ງກ່າວວ່າ ທ່ານໄດ້ອອກບວດໃນໄວໜຸ່ມ ເນື່ອງຈາກທ່ານແລະສະຫາຍໄດ້ໃຊ້ເວດມົນລັກລອບເຂົ້າໄປໃນພະລາຊະວັງແລ້ວຖືກຈັບໄດ້. ສະຫາຍຂອງທ່ານຖືກປະຫານຊີວິດ, ແຕ່ເນື່ອງຈາກທ່ານໄດ້ອະທິຖານວ່າ ຫາກລອດພົ້ນຈາກການຖືກຈັບກຸມໃນຄັ້ງນີ້ ຈະອອກບວດໃນພຣະພຸດທະສາສະໜາ. ຫຼັງຈາກອຸປະສົມບົດແລ້ວ ທ່ານໄດ້ສຶກສາພຣະໄຕປິດົກຈົນລະອຽດ ຈົບພາຍໃນ 90 ວັນ ແລະ ມີຄວາມຮອບຮູ້ໃນໄຕເພທ (Vedas) ລວມທັງສິລະປະສາດນາໆ ຊະນິດ.
ປະຫວັດຂອງທ່ານປາກົດເປັນຕຳນານເຊິງອະພິນິຫານໃນພຸດທະສາສະໜາສຳນັກຕ່າງໆ ຈົນຍາກທີ່ຈະຫາຂໍ້ສະຫຼຸບໄດ້. ຕຳນານເລົ່າວ່າ ທ່ານໄດ້ລົງໄປຍັງເມືອງບາດານເພື່ອອັນເຊີນຄຳພີ ປັດຊະຍາປາຣະມິຕາ (Prajnaparamita) ຂຶ້ນມາຈາກນາກມົນທຽນ ແລະ ເປັນຜູ້ເປີດກຸພຣະທຳເລັ້ນລັບຂອງ ມົນຕະລະຍານ (Mantrayana) ເຊິ່ງພຣະວັດຊະຣະສັດ (Vajrasattva) ໄດ້ບັນຈຸໄວ້ໃນສະຖູບເຫຼັກ. ມີການກ່າວອ້າງວ່າທ່ານໄດ້ພຳນັກຢູ່ໃນສະຖານທີ່ຫຼາຍແຫ່ງຂອງອິນເດຍ ເຊັ່ນ: ສີບັນພົດ (Shriparvata) ໃນອິນເດຍພາກໃຕ້. ໃນຄຳພີທິເບດກ່າວວ່າ ທ່ານໄດ້ໃຊ້ເວລາຊ່ວງໜຶ່ງຢູ່ທີ່ນາລັນທາອີກດ້ວຍ.
ທີ່ມາຂອງຊື່ ສຳລັບນາມວ່າ "ນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ" ນັ້ນ ມີທີ່ມາຈາກຄຳວ່າ ນາກ (Naga) ກັບ ອໍຣະຊຸນ (Arjuna) ໂດຍທີ່ "ອໍຣະຊຸນ" ແມ່ນຊື່ຂອງຕົ້ນໄມ້ເຊິ່ງເຊື່ອກັນວ່າແມ່ນບ່ອນກຳເນີດຂອງທ່ານ. ບາງແຫ່ງກໍໃຫ້ຄຳອະທິບາຍຕ່າງອອກໄປວ່າ ນາກ ໝາຍເຖິງ ປັນຍາຊານ (Gnosis) ທີ່ສະແດງເຖິງສະມັດຖະພາບທາງສະຕິປັນຍາຂອງຜູ້ທີ່ສາມາດເອົາຊະນະກິເລດສະວະໄດ້. ດັ່ງນັ້ນ, ຊື່ຂອງພຣະນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ ຈຶ່ງອາດແມ່ນຊື່ແທ້ ຫຼື ແມ່ນນາມສາຍາທີ່ບຸກຄົນຍົກຍ້ອງຂຶ້ນໃນພາຍຫຼັງກໍເປັນໄດ້.
ມີຂໍ້ສັນນິດຖານຫຼາຍຢ່າງກ່ຽວກັບເລື່ອງນີ້, ເຖິງຢ່າງໃດກໍຕາມ ມີຄວາມເປັນໄປໄດ້ວ່າ ນັກປາດທີ່ມີນາມວ່ານາກາຣະຊຸນນະນັ້ນ ອາດມີຢູ່ຫຼາຍທ່ານ ເຮັດໃຫ້ບຸກຄົນໃນຊັ້ນຫຼັງເກີດຄວາມສັບສົນ ແລະ ເຂົ້າໃຈຜິດວ່າແມ່ນບຸກຄົນດຽວກັນ ຈົນເຮັດໃຫ້ມີຕຳນານເລື່ອງລາວປາກົດອອກມາແຕກຕ່າງກັນ. ແຕ່ໃນທາງປັດຊະຍາແລ້ວ ຍ່ອມຖືເອົາຄຸຣຸນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ ຜູ້ແຕ່ງຄຳພີມາທະຍະມິກະສາດ (Madhyamika Shastra) ເປັນສຳຄັນ.
ຜົນງານການຂຽນ ງານຂຽນຂອງນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ ຖືເປັນພື້ນຖານການກຳເນີດສຳນັກ ມັດທະຍາມະກະ (Madhyamaka) ເຊິ່ງໄດ້ມີການຖ່າຍທອດໄປຍັງປະເທດຈີນ ໂດຍຮຽກວ່າ ສຳນັກສາມຄຳພີ (Sanlun: 三論). ທ່ານໄດ້ຮັບການຍົກຍ້ອງນັບຖືໃນຖານະຜູ້ສະຖາປະນາແນວຄິດປັດຊະຍາປາຣະມິຕາ ແລະ ມີຄວາມສຳພັນໃກ້ຊິດກັບມະຫາວິທະຍາໄລນາລັນທາ.
ຄຳພີສຳຄັນຂອງທ່ານນາກາຣະຊຸນນະທີ່ຍັງເຫຼືອມາຮອດປັດຈຸບັນໄດ້ແກ່: ມູລະມັດທະຍາມະກະກາຣິກາ (Mulamadhyamakakarika), ສູນຍະຕາສັບຕະຕິ (Shunyatasaptati), ຍຸກຕິສັດຕິກາ (Yuktisastika), ວິຄຣະຫະວະຍາວະຣະຕະນີ (Vigrahavyavartani), ສຸຫະລຶນເລຂະ (Suhrllekha), ຣັດຕະນາວະລີ (Ratnavali) ແລະ ໄວທັນຍະປະກະຣະນະ (Vaidalyaprakarana). ເຊິ່ງທັງໝົດລ້ວນແຕ່ແມ່ນການອັດຖາອະທິບາຍພຸດທະພົດດ້ວຍຕັກກະວິທະຍາທີ່ສຽບຄົມ ແລະ ຫຼັກປັດຊະຍາສູນຍະຕະວາດ (Shunyavada). ນອກຈາກນີ້, ຍັງມີງານຂຽນອີກຈຳນວນຫຼາຍທີ່ອ້າງວ່າແມ່ນຜົນງານຂອງທ່ານເພື່ອໃຫ້ງານນັ້ນໆ ມີຄວາມໜ້າເຊື່ອຖື, ເຊິ່ງຜົນງານຫຼາຍເຫຼັ້ມຍັງຄົງເປັນທີ່ຖົກຖຽງກັນວ່າມັນແມ່ນຜົນງານທີ່ແທ້ຈິງຂອງທ່ານຫຼືບໍ່
ແນວຄິດທາງປັດຊະຍາ
ພຣະນາກາຣະຊຸນນະ ອະທິບາຍຫຼັກພຸດທະພົດເທິງພື້ນຖານຂອງປັດຊະຍາ ສູນຍະຕະວາດ (Shunyavada) ເຊິ່ງກ່າວໄວ້ຢ່າງຊັດເຈນໃນງານຂຽນຂອງທ່ານຄື "ມາທະຍະມິກະສາດ". ຄຳວ່າ "ມາທະຍະມິກະ" ໝາຍເຖິງ ທາງສາຍກາງ, ດັ່ງນັ້ນ ແນວຄິດຂອງມາທະຍະມິກະ ກໍຄືປັດຊະຍາສາຍກາງລະຫວ່າງ ສັດສະຕະທິດຖິ (ຄວາມເຫັນວ່າສິ່ງທັງປວງມີຢູ່ຢ່າງທ່ຽງແທ້) ແລະ ອຸດເຊທະທິດຖິ (ຄວາມເຫັນວ່າທຸກຢ່າງຂາດສູນ).
ຕາມທີ່ພຸດທະປັດຊະຍາອະທິບາຍວ່າ ສັບພະສິ່ງລ້ວນອີງອາໄສກັນເກີດຂຶ້ນ, ບໍ່ມີສິ່ງໃດມີ ສະວະພາວະ (Svabhava) ທີ່ດຳລົງຢູ່ໄດ້ດ້ວຍຕົວຂອງມັນເອງ ຈຶ່ງຮຽກວ່າ ສູນຍະຕາ. ເຖິງຢ່າງໃດກໍຕາມ, ມັນບໍ່ໄດ້ໝາຍຄວາມວ່າແມ່ນຄວາມວ່າງເປົ່າ ຫຼື ຂາດສູນແບບອຸດເຊທະທິດຖິ, ແຕ່ໝາຍເຖິງການທີ່ "ບໍ່ມີສາຣະແກ່ນສານໃນຕົວເອງ" ແຕ່ເປັນເພາະເຫດປັດໄຈອີງອາໄສກັນເກີດຂຶ້ນຕາມຫຼັກປັດຈະຍາການ. ສັບພະສິ່ງໃນໂລກຈຶ່ງລ້ວນແຕ່ແມ່ນຄວາມສຳພັນ ເຊັ່ນ: ຄວາມສັ້ນ ແລະ ຄວາມຍາວ ເກີດຂຶ້ນເພາະມີການປຽບທຽບກັບອີກສິ່ງໜຶ່ງສະເໝີ. ດັ່ງນັ້ນ, ສາຣະອັນແທ້ຈິງຂອງຄວາມສັ້ນແລະຄວາມຍາວຈຶ່ງບໍ່ມີ ມັນຈຶ່ງເປັນສູນຍະຕາ. ແລະ ທຸກສິ່ງໂດຍສະພາບປໍຣະມັດແລ້ວ ລ້ວນແຕ່ແມ່ນສູນຍະຕາ ປາສະຈາກແກ່ນສານໃຫ້ຍຶດໝັ້ນຖືໝັ້ນໄດ້. ແນວຄິດຂອງມາທະຍະມິກະແມ່ນພັດທະນາການທາງຕັກກະວິທະຍາທີ່ສຸຂຸມລຸ່ມລຶກຂອງມະຫາຍານ ເພື່ອໃຊ້ເຫດຜົນທາງຕັກກະຄັດຄ້ານຄວາມເຊື່ອໃນການມີຢູ່ຂອງ ອັດຕາ (Atman) ລວມທັງ ປະຣະມັດຕະມັນ (Paramatman) ເຊິ່ງພຣາມ ແລະ..ລັດທິນອກພຣະພຸດທະສາສະໜາ ອື່ນໆ ເຊື່ອຖືວ່າ (ອັດຕາ) ເປັນສິ່ງທີ່ດຳລົງຢູ່ດ້ວຍຕົວເອງ, ບໍ່ອີງອາໄສສິ່ງໃດ ແລະ ເປັນແກ່ນສານຂອງສັບພະສິ່ງ. ແຕ່ຫຼັກປັດຊະຍາຂອງພຣະພຸດທະສາສະໜາຍ່ອມສອນໃຫ້ເຂົ້າເຖິງຄວາມດັບຮອບໂດຍແທ້ຈິງ, ແມ່ນແຕ່ທັງ "ຜູ້ຮູ້" ແລະ "ສິ່ງທີ່ຮູ້" ກໍຍ່ອມດັບສິ້ນທັງໝົດ. ກ່າວຄືໂດຍປະຣະມັດແລ້ວ ທັງພຣະນິບພານ ແລະ ຜູ້ບັນລຸນິບພານຍ່ອມເປັນສູນນັ້ນເອງ.
ຍ້ອນວ່າເມື່ອທັມທັງປວງເປັນ ອະນັດຕາ (Anatta) ເກີດຈາກເຫດປັດໄຈ ຈຶ່ງປາສະຈາກຕົວຕົນ. ເມື່ອປາສະຈາກແກ່ນສານຕົວຕົນແລ້ວ, ສິ່ງໃດເຫຼົ່ານັ້ນທີ່ຈະເປັນຜູ້ດັບກິເລດ ແລະ ບັນລຸພຣະນິບພານ? ພວກເຮົາຈະເຫັນໄດ້ວ່າມັນວ່າງເປົ່າທັງໝົດ, ບໍ່ມີສັດບຸກຄົນມາຕັ້ງແຕ່ທຳອິດ, ເປັນພຽງແຕ່ຊື່ຮຽກວ່າ ສັດ, ບຸກຄົນ, ຕົວຕົນ, ເຮົາ, ເຂົາ ເທົ່ານັ້ນ. ສັງສາຣະວັດລ້ວນແຕ່ແມ່ນມາຍາ, ໂດຍແທ້ຈິງແລ້ວ ຫາໄດ້ມີສະພາວະໃດເກີດຂຶ້ນ ຫຼື ດັບໄປບໍ່. ເພາະສະນັ້ນ ຈຶ່ງກ່າວວ່າ ຕົວຕົນຜູ້ບັນລຸນິບພານບໍ່ມີເສຍແລ້ວ, ພຣະນິບພານທີ່ຜູ້ນັ້ນຈະບັນລຸ ຈຶ່ງພອຍບໍ່ມີໄປນຳ.
ຕົວຢ່າງໃນເລື່ອງນີ້ ປັດຊະຍາມາທະຍະມິກະ ໄດ້ໃຊ້ອຸປະມາວ່າ: ປຽບເໝືອນ "ມາຍາບຸລຸດ" (ຄົນທີ່ເນລະມິດຂຶ້ນ) ຄົນໜຶ່ງປະຫານມາຍາບຸລຸດອີກຄົນໜຶ່ງ, ການປະຫານຂອງມາຍາບຸລຸດທັງສອງຍ່ອມເປັນມາຍາໄປດ້ວຍສັນໃດ, ທັງຜູ້ບັນລຸນິບພານແລະສະພາວະແຫ່ງນິບພານຍ່ອມເປັນສູນໄປດ້ວຍສັນນັ້ນ. ຫຼື ປຽບດັ່ງກິ່ງຟ້າເຊິ່ງບໍ່ມີຢູ່ຈິງ, ສິ່ງທີ່ແຂວນຢູ່ເທິງກິ່ງຟ້າກໍຍ່ອມມີບໍ່ໄດ້.
ເມື່ອຕົວຕົນ, ອັດຕາ, ຫຼື ອາຕະມັນ ເປັນສິ່ງວ່າງເປົ່າທີ່ບໍ່ມີແກ່ນສານຢູ່ຈິງ, ເປັນພຽງສົມມຸດໂວຫານ, ການປະຫານກິເລດຂອງສິ່ງທີ່ບໍ່ມີຈິງນັ້ນຈະເປັນຈິງໄດ້ແນວໃດ? ຫາກເກີດຄວາມເຂົ້າໃຈຜິດວ່າ "ມີສິ່ງທີ່ຕົນປະຫານ" ຫຼື "ມີສິ່ງທີ່ຕົນບັນລຸ" (ມັກ, ຜົນ, ນິບພານ), ຈະຫຼີກລ່ຽງສ່ວນສຸດທັງສອງຂ້າງ (ທ່ຽງແທ້-ຂາດສູນ) ໄດ້ແນວໃດ? ມາທະຍະມິກະສະແດງຫຼັກວ່າ ທັງ ສັງຂະຕະທຳ ແລະ ອະສັງຂະຕະທຳ ມີສະພາບເທົ່າກັນຄືເປັນສູນຍະຕາ. ຫາກສັງຂະຕະທຳເປັນມາຍາບໍ່ມີຢູ່ຈິງໂດຍປະຣະມັດແລ້ວ, ອະສັງຂະຕະທຳອັນເປັນຄູ່ຕົງຂ້າມກໍຍ່ອມບໍ່ມີໄປດ້ວຍ. ປຽບດັ່ງ "ດອກຟ້າ" ກັບ "ເຂົາກະຕ່າຍ" ຫຼື "ນາງຫີນມີຄັນ" ເຊິ່ງເປັນສິ່ງທີ່ບໍ່ເຄີຍມີໃນໂລກ, ບຸດທີ່ເກີດຈາກນາງຫີນມີຄັນຈະມີໄດ້ແນວໃດ?
ເຖິງຢ່າງໃດກໍຕາມ, ປັດຊະຍາສູນຍະວາດ ຍັງຢືນຢັນໃນເລື່ອງນິບພານ ແລະ ບຸນບາບວ່າເປັນສິ່ງທີ່ມີຢູ່, ພຽງແຕ່ຄັດຄ້ານສິ່ງທີ່ດຳລົງຢູ່ດ້ວຍຕົວຂອງມັນເອງ (ສະພາວະ) ເທົ່ານັ້ນ. ຍ້ອນສັບພະສິ່ງເປັນສູນຍະຕາ (ປ່ຽນແປງໄດ້), ຄົນເຮັດກຳດີຍ່ອມໄດ້ດີ, ເຮັດກຳຊົ່ວຍ່ອມໄດ້ຊົ່ວ, ປຸຖຸຊົນຈຶ່ງບັນລຸເປັນພຣະອະຣິຍະໄດ້. ຫາກສັບພະສິ່ງທ່ຽງແທ້ຢູ່ດ້ວຍຕົວມັນເອງແລ້ວ ຍ່ອມບໍ່ແປຜັນ, ເມື່ອນັ້ນມັກຜົນນິບພານກໍຈະມີບໍ່ໄດ້ເລີຍ.
Nāgārjuna
Nāgārjuna (Sanskrit, from Nāga + Arjuna; Chn. Lóngshù 龍樹; Tib. Klu sgrub; c. 150 – c. 250 CE) was a philosopher and Mahāyāna Buddhist monk from South India, considered the founder of the Madhyamaka (Centrism, Middle Way) school.
Nāgārjuna is widely considered to be the most important Buddhist philosopher after the Buddha himself. Indeed, in Tibetan Buddhism, he is even called the "second Buddha". He was a well known defender of the Mahāyāna movement and his treatises (śāstras) are the foundational texts of a school of Buddhist philosophy known as the view of emptiness (Śūnyatāvāda) or Madhyamaka. Nāgārjuna remains a key figure in all contemporary traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and his philosophical writings on the doctrine of “emptiness” (śūnyatā) influenced Indian philosophy for a millennium, as well as being an indispensable doctrinal source for Mahāyāna doctrine in East Asian Buddhism and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.
Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Root Verses on Madhyamaka, MMK) is the most important text on the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness. The MMK inspired a large number of commentaries in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Korean and Japanese and continues to be studied toda
History
A map of the Satavahana Kingdom, showing the location of Amaravathi (where Nāgārjuna may have lived and worked according to Walser) and Vidarbha (the birthplace of Nāgārjuna according to Kumārajīva)
Background
India in the first and second centuries CE was politically divided into various states, including the Kushan Empire and the Satavahana Kingdom. At this point in Buddhist history, the Buddhist community was already divided into various Buddhist schools and had spread throughout India.
At this time, there was already a small and nascent
Life
Very little is reliably known of the life of Nāgārjuna and modern historians do not agree on a specific date or place (multiple places in India suggested) for him. Nevertheless, most scholars place him somewhere in South India at some time between 1st to 3rd century CE. The surviving accounts were written in Chinese and Tibetan centuries after his death and are mostly hagiographical accounts that are historically unverifiable. The earliest accounts date to Kumārajīva's time (350−409 or 344−413) and are quite sparse in detail, while Tibetan accounts date from much later (11th century onwards).
Some scholars such as Joseph Walser argue that Nāgārjuna was an advisor to a king of the Sātavāhana dynasty which ruled the Deccan Plateau in the second century. This is supported by most of the traditional hagiographical sources as well. Archaeological evidence at Amarāvatī indicates that if this is true, the king may have
A model of the Amaravati Stupa
Walser also thinks that it is most likely that when Nāgārjuna wrote the Ratnavali, he lived in a mixed monastery (with Mahāyānists and non-Mahāyānists) in which Mahāyānists were the minority. The most likely sectarian affiliation of the monastery according to Walser was Purvasailya, Aparasailya
The earliest biographical sources on Nāgārjuna are associated with the Kuchan translator monk Kumārajīva (344–413) and his circle of scholars. They include the Zhu weimo-jie jing (注維摩詰經; T. 1775, a commentary on the Vimalakirti), the Maming pusa zhuan (馬鳴菩薩傳, Tradition of Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva, a combined biography of Nāgārjuna and Aśvaghoṣa) and also various prefaces to the Chinese translations to Nāgārjuna's works, such the preface to the Zhong lun (中論; *Madhyamaka-śāstra, T. 1564) and the preface to the Da zhidu lun (大智度論; T.1509).
These writings paint a minimal picture of Nāgārjuna, who is depicted as the greatest bodhisattva since Śākyamuni himself. He is depicted as living during a time when the Dharma was "decadent and weak" and as saving the Mahāyāna by championing its teachings through debate and textual composition. According to Huiyuan's preface to the Da zhidu lun, Nāgārjuna was a virtuous gentleman who, saddened at the delusion of the masses, took the vows of a monk and "dwelt in seclusion in the woods and swamps, lived as a hermit and practiced dhyāna. He stilled his mind and studied the subtle, his thoughts penetrating the supranormal." According to Huiyuan, Nāgārjuna had an awakening, and then travelled to the Himālayas, where he received the Mahāyāna teachings from a śramaṇa. He then travelled to the palace of the nāgas, where "there was no important canon or secret text that he did not master." Then, according to Huiyuan,
When the roots of his impediments had been pulled up, his name crowned the stages of the [bodhisattva] path … Consequently, the non-Buddhists esteemed his manner and famous gentlemen submitted to his dictates. F
This basic account of Nāgārjuna as a great Mahāyāna revivalist is echoed by the writings of Sengzhao, and Sengrui, both students of Kumārajīva. For example, Sengrui writes that at the end of the age of Semblance Dharma false teachings flourished, and then Nāgārjuna's writings "opened the great road in such a manner that the carriage of the Greater Vehicle could advance straight ahead". Sengzhao also tells a story of Nāgārjuna defeating a non-buddhist in debate.
Later hagiographies were composed in China and in Tibet. Chinese hagiographies include the Longshu pusa zhuan (T. 2047), which, while traditionally attributed to Kumārajīva, is likely a later composition, and the Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan (T. 2058). These texts state that Nāgārjuna was a Brahmin who had mastered all the Vedas and traditional Brahmin arts and then converted to Buddhism, later travelling to the palace of the dragons (nagas) under the ocean. They also contain various miraculous stories, depicting Nāgārjuna as a spellcasting wonderworker who is a master of mantras as well as alchemy, able to defeat haughty Brahmins in battles of intellect and magic duels. The traditional religious hagiographies place Nāgārjuna in various Indian regions. Chinese sources, as well as Candrakirti, place him in Vidarbha, South India, while Xuanzang mentions he was from south Kosala.
Traditional religious hagiographies also associate Nāgārjuna with the teaching of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, as well as with having revealed these scriptures to the world after they had remained hidden for some time. The sources differ on where this happened and how N
Nāgārjuna himself is often depicted in composite form comprising human and nāga characteristics. Nāgas are snake-like supernatural beings of great magical power that feature in Hindu, Buddhist and Jain mythology. Nāgas are found throughout Indian religious culture, and typically signify intelligent serpents or dragons that are responsible
Tibetan and Chinese Esoteric sources also associate Nāgārjuna with the use of mantras, and with the Vajrayana tradition in general. For example, Yijing (635–713) writes that Nāgārjuna had passed down the teachings of the Vidyādharapiṭaka ("Canon of the Spell-Wielders"), which was a legendary source of Buddhist dhāraṇī and mantra incantations, to his disciple Nanda, placing him at the beginning of the East Asian Buddhist esoteric tradition, which soon began to see him as their founding patriarch. In a similar fashion, the Pure Land tradition also considers Nāgārjuna to be its first patriarch, basing itself on the Chinese translation of the Dasabhumikavibhāsā (Commentary on the Ten Stages Sutra) which discusses how to be born in the Sukhāvatī pure land of Amitābha Buddha. To authenticate their view of Nāgārjuna as patriarch, Pure Land authors drew on this and other classic sources, like a prophecy found in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra of Nāgārjuna's rebirth in Sukhāvatī, and the Pure Land Rebirth Dhāraṇī (T. 368) which is said to have been received by Nāgārjuna in a dream, according to a colophon to the dhāraṇī.
Traditional sources also claim that Nāgārjuna practised ayurvedic alchemy (rasāyana), creating elixirs of long life, among other substances. The Longshu pusa zhuan, for example, depicts Nāgārjuna making an elixir of invisibility, and Buton Rinchen Drub, Taranatha and Xuanzang all state that he could turn rocks into gold.
Tibetan hagiographies also state that Nāgārjuna studied at Nālanda Mahavihara. However, according to Walser, this university was not a strong monastic center until about 425. Also, as Walser notes, "Xuanzang and Yijing both spent considerable time at Nālanda and studied Nāgārjuna’s texts there. It is strange that they would have spent so
Some sources (Buton Rinchen Drub and the other Tibetan historians) claim that in his later years, Nāgārjuna lived on the mountain of Śrīparvata near the city that would later be called Nāgārjunakoṇḍa ("Hill of Nāgārjuna"). The ruins of Nāgārjunakoṇḍan are located in Guntur district, Andhra Pradesh. The C
Other Nāgārjunas
There are a multitude of texts attributed to "Nāgārjuna", many of these texts date from much later periods. This has caused much confusion for the traditional Buddhist biographers and doxographers. Modern scholars a
Some scholars have posited that there was a separate Aryuvedic writer called Nāgārjuna who wrote numerous treatises on Rasayana. Also, there is a later Tantric Buddhist au
There is also a Jain figure of the same name who was said to have tr
Works
There exist a number of influential texts attributed to Nāgārjuna; however, as there are many pseudepigrapha attributed to him, lively controversy exists over which are his authentic works. The Chinese Canon includes over 22 texts attributed to Nāgārjuna, while the Tibetan Tanjur contains over 140 works attributed to Nāgārjuna.
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK, Root Verses on the Middle Way) is Nāgārjuna's best-known work. It is a rich philosophical text made up of concise aphoristic Sanskrit kārikā verses which explains the theory of emptiness through numerous topics and arguments. The bulk of the verses focus on defeating and deconstructing arguments for substance theories. The work also relies on earlier sources like the Kātyāyana Sutra and the Perfection of Wisdom sutras to expound on the theory of dependent arising and the universal emptiness of all things.
The earliest translation of and commentary on the MMK is found in the Chinese translation of Kumārajīva, called the Madhyamakaśāstra (Zhong lun 中論; T. 1564), which merges the root text with a commentary attributed to a certain Qingmu (青目, *Piṅgala).
Major attributed works
Nagarjuna composing texts in front of his disciples, relief at Buddhavanam Stupa, Telangana.
According to David Seyfort Ruegg, the Madhyamakasastrastuti attributed to Candrakirti (c.600 – c. 650) refers to eight texts by Nagarjuna:
the (Madhyamaka) karikas, the Yuktisastika, the Sunyatasaptati, the Vigrahavyavartani, the Vidala (i.e. Vaidalyasutra / Vaidalyaprakarana), the Ratnavali, the Sutrasamuccaya, and
Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way, MMK), available in three Sanskrit manuscripts and numerous translations.
Śūnyatāsaptati (Seventy Verses on Emptiness), accompanied by a prose commentary ascribed to Nagarjuna himself.
Vigrahavyāvartanī (The End of Disputes).
Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (Pulverizing the Categories), a prose work critiquing the categories used by Indian Nyaya philosophy.
Vyavahārasid
dhi (Proof of Convention). Yuktiṣāṣṭika (Sixty Verses on Reasoning).
Catu
ḥstava (Four Hymns): Lokātīta-stava (Hymn to transcendence), Niraupamya-stava (to the Pe erless), Acintya-stava (to the Inconceivable), and Paramārtha-stava (to Ultimate Truth). Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), subtitled (rajaparikatha), a discourse addressed to an Indian king (possibly a Satavahana monarch).
Pratītyasamutpādahṝdayakārika (Verses on the heart of Dependent Arising), along with a short commentary (Vyākhyāna).
Sūtrasamuccaya, an anthology of various sutra passages.
Bodhicittavivaraṇa (Exposition of the awakening mind).
Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend).
Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (Requisites of awakening), a work the path of the Bodhisattva and paramitas, it is quoted by Candrakirti in his commentary on Aryadeva's four hundred. Now only extant in Chinese translation (Taisho 1660).
Other scholars have challenged and argued against some of the above works being Nagarjuna's. David F. Burton notes that Chr
Similarly, Jan Westerhoff notes how there is uncertainty about the attribution of Nagarjuna's works (and about his life in general). He relies on six works: MMK, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati, Yuktiṣāṣṭika, Vaidalyaprakaraṇa and Ratnāvalī, all of which "expound a single, coherent philosophical system", and are attributed to Nagarjuna by a variety of Indian and Tibetan sources.
The Tibetan historian Buston considers the first six to be the main treatises of Nāgārjuna (this is called the "yukti corpus", rigs cho
Other attributed works
In addition to works mentioned above, numerous other works are attributed to Nāgārjuna, many of which are dubious attributions and later works. There is an ongoing, lively controversy over which of those works are authentic. Christian Li
Lindtner further divides the third category of dubious or questionable texts into those which are "perhaps authen
Those which he sees as perhaps being authentic include:
Mahāyānavimsika: It is cited as Nagarjuna's work in the Tattvasamgraha as well as by Atisha; Lindtner sees the style and content as compatible with the yukti corpus. Survives in Sanskrit.
Bodhicittotpādavidhi: A short text that describes the sevenfold write for a bodhisattva.
Dvadasakāranayastotra: A madhyamaka text only extant in Tibetan.
(Madhyamaka-)Bhavasamkrānti: A verse from this is attributed to Nagarjuna by Bhavaviveka.
Nirālamba-stava.
Sālistambakārikā: Only exists in Tibetan; it is a versification of the Śālistamba Sūtra.
Stutytitastava: Only exists in Tibetan.
Danaparikatha: Only exists in Tibetan, a praise of giving (dana).
Cittavajrastava.
Mulasarvāstivadisrāmanerakārikā: 50 karikas on the Vinaya of the Mulasarvastivadins.
Dasabhumikavibhāsā: Only exists in Chinese, a commentary on the Dashabhumikasutra.
Lokapariksā.
Yogasataka: A medical text.
Prajñadanda.
Rasavaisesikasutra: A rasayana (biochemical) text.
Bhāvanākrama: Contains various verses similar to the Lankavatara; it is cited in the Tattvasamgraha as by Nagarjuna.
Rasaratnākara: Deals with the formation of mercury compounds.
Ruegg notes various works of uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Nagarjuna, including the Dharmadhatustava (Hymn to the Dharmadhatu, which shows later influences), Mahayanavimsika, Salistambakarikas, the Bhavasamkranti, and the Dasabhumtkavibhāsā. Furthermore, Ruegg writes that "three collections of stanzas on the virtues of intelligence and moral conduct ascribed to Nagarjuna are extant in Tibetan translation": Prajñasatakaprakarana, Nitisastra-Jantuposanabindu and Niti-sastra-Prajñadanda.
Attributions which are likely to be false
Meanwhile, those texts that Lindtner considers as questionable and likely inauthentic are: Aksarasataka, Akutobhaya (Mulamadhyamakavrtti), Aryabhattaraka-Manjusriparamarthastuti, Kayatrayastotra, Narakoddharastava, Niruttarastava, Vandanastava, Dharmasamgraha, Dharmadhatugarbhavivarana, Ekaslokasastra, Isvarakartrtvanirakrtih (A refutation of God/Isvara), Sattvaradhanastava, Upayahrdaya, Astadasasunyatasastra, Dharmadhatustava,
Meanwhile, Lindtner's list of outright wrong attributions is: Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Dà zhìdù lùn), Abudhabodhakaprakarana, Guhyasamajatantratika, Dvadasadvaraka, Prajñaparamitastotra, and Svabhavatrayapravesasiddhi.
Notably, the Dà zhìdù lùn (Taisho 1509, "Commentary on the great prajñaparamita") which has been influential in Chinese Buddhism, has been questioned as a genuine work of Nāgārjuna by various scholars including Lamotte. This work is also only attested in a Chinese translation by Kumārajīva and is unk
Other works are extant only in Chinese, one of these is the Shih-erh-men-lun or 'Twelve-topic treatise' (*Dvadasanikaya or *Dvadasamukha-sastra); one of the three basic treatises of the Sanlun school (East Asian Madhyamak
Several works considered important in esoteric Buddhism are attributed to Nāgārjuna and his disciples by traditional historians like Tāranātha from 17th century Tibet. These historians try to account for chronological difficulties with various theories, such as seeing later writings as mystical revelations. For a
Teaching and philosophy
Statue of Nāgārjuna in front of a Buddhist temple in Elista, Kalmykia, Russia
Nāgārjuna's teachings bring together key Buddhist doctrines, particularly emptiness, not-self and pratītyasamutpāda("dependent origination"), to refute the metaphysics of some of his contemporaries and present a coherent Mahayana Buddhist worldview. The core of his thought is based on refuting all metaphysical theories of svabhāva (substances), which leads to the middle way (madhyamā pratipad), which avoids metaphysically extreme views of existence (astitva/bhāva) and views of nonexistence (nāstitva/abhāva), also known as the views of eternalism (śāśvata) and annihilationism (uccheda). Because of this, Nāgārjuna's philosophical teaching is called the "middling" or "centrist" view (Madhyamaka), though this term was first introduced by Bhavaviveka in the sixth century.
Apart from the more famous rational works which focus on emptiness (called the "yukti" corpus), Nāgārjuna also wrote various texts which discuss other aspects of the Buddhist religion, including texts that discuss the bodhisattva path such as the Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend), and the Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (Requisites of Awakening). These sources contain most of his discussions on ethics and religious practice and are forerunners to later Mahayana treatises on the bodhisattva path. Furthermore, there is a set of four religious hymns (the Catuḥstava) widely attributed to Nāgārjuna. These describe the ultimate truth in more poetic and positive ways than the rationalistic writings.
Some scholars such as Fyodor Shcherbatskoy and T.R.V. Murti held that Nāgārjuna was the inventor of the emptiness doctrine; however, more recent work by scholars such as Choong Mun-keat, Yin Shun and Dhammajothi Thero argue that Nāgārjuna was the main defender of a doctrine already found in earlier sources, including early Buddhist works as well as Mahayana sutras.
Emptiness
Nagarjuna Retrieves the Prajñaparamita Sutras, relief at Buddhavanam Stupa, Telangana. The Prajñaparamita texts are a major source for the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness.
A central theme of Nāgārjuna's writings, especially his philosophical texts, is the key Mahayana concept of śūnyatā(Sanskrit, translated into English as "emptiness"), which for Nāgārjuna means that all things are empty of svabhāva(inherent existence, intrinsic nature).
Jan Westerhoff notes that the meaning of svabhāva has metaphysical and cognitive dimensions. Metaphysically it is a kind of unchanging substance, a primary existent (dravyasat), an "objective and irreducible constituent of the world" which exists independently and by itself, without depending on anything else. This concept, which was defended in some way or another by Buddhist schools like Vaibhāṣika and by non-buddhist schools like Vaiśeṣika, is the main target of Nāgārjuna's arguments. Regarding the cognitive aspect, this relates to how sentient beings reify objects by mentally superimposing svabhāva, contributing to craving and suffering. It is only by deconstructing and letting go of our cognitive faults that we can attain liberation from suffering. Thus, Nāgārjuna's philosophy of emptiness is always done with this soteriological goal in mind.For Nāgārjuna, it is not merely sentient beings that are without an unchanging self (ātman); all phenomena (dharmas) are without any svabhāva and thus without any underlying unchanging essence or substance. This is so because all things always arise dependent on other causes and conditions: not by their own power. Indeed, for Nāgārjuna, emptiness is just another way of speaking about the Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda).
All phenomena are thus empty of being independently existent or having any independent being or nature. Nāgārjuna's "argumentative" or "reasoning" works (Sanskrit: yukti) focus on defending the doctrine of emptiness and refuting any substantialist or foundationalist theories of svabhāva, which include any nature that is not produced by causes (akrtaka), and which is not dependent on anything else.
To say that all things are 'empty' is to deny any kind of ontological foundation; therefore Nāgārjuna's view is often seen as a kind of ontological anti-foundationalism or a metaphysical anti-realism by modern philosophers.
Arguments against svabhāva theory
In Nāgārjuna's central philosophical work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), he provides numerous arguments against svabhāva theory. Nāgārjuna never provides a single "master argument"; instead, he dismantles various arguments for svabhāva one by one throughout the various chapters of the MMK, which discuss topics such as causation, time, movement, change, mereology, personal identity, and conceptual dependence. This is what later came to be called the prāsaṅgika method, which relies on refutations that seek to show the unintended consequences (Sanskrit: "prāsaṅga") of the opponent's arguments and positions. In each of the chapters of the MMK, various substantialist theories on different philosophical topics are analysed, deconstructed and attacked.
Nāgārjuna is known for his use of the Indian logical tool of the tetralemma (Sanskrit: catuṣkoṭi, "four corners") to attack versions of substance theory. This schema relies on four propositions: something can be said to exist (or be true), not exist (or be false), both 1 and 2 are affirmed together, or 1 and 2 are both rejected. Nāgārjuna's arguments usually work systematically to negate all "corners" of this logical schema, leaving us without any views to hold on to, and ideally with a sense of apophatic peace.
Causation
Nāgārjuna begins his MMK with a discussion of causation. He analyses various ways of understanding cause and effect through the lens of svabhāva theory and shows how they are logically unsatisfactory. Nāgārjuna then applies similar types of arguments for other concepts in later chapters of the MMK. Understanding the arguments on causation used in the first chapter of the MMK then allows us to see how Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka method functions and how the theory of emptiness is to be understood.
For Nāgārjuna, causes and effects are not completely distinct and independent objects or things, and they also do not function independently of the mind. His most famous analysis of causation distinguishes between four possible ways any thing or phenomenon (dharma) could arise or be produced, and then refutes each of these. These four possibilities are:
Things arise from themselves (i.e. they are self-caused). This view was usually defended by arguing that the effect was already contained in the cause, or by saying that the effect and the cause are the same thing. Nāgārjuna argues against both views. In particular, he notes that since one does not observe effects within causes, this view is unfounded.
Things arise from other things (causation from another). This is the most natural understanding of causation, defended by Abhidharma Buddhists and non-buddhists alike. But Nāgārjuna also rejects this position, arguing that cause and effect cannot be distinct in a substantial sense. This is because, the effect depends on the cause for its existence, and the cause also depends on the effect (at least conceptually, for it to be a cause, it must have an effect). Furthermore, he argues that if causes and effects truly were different substances then they could not be connected to each other, since two distinct substances cannot have a dependence relation.
Things arise from both themselves and from other things. This can be explained as holding that a cause (e.g. marble) contains a potentiality (e.g. the potential to become a statue) within that is realised through supporting external conditions (like the actions of a sculptor). But Nāgārjuna argues that these distinctions do not exist substantially either, since the supporting conditions and the result do not exist apart from the cause, and thus they cannot be said to exist substantially and independently.
Things arise from neither themselves nor from other things. This is usually presented as the view that things arise without causes. But this must be rejected because nothing appears to arise without some casual order. Thus this view would mean that knowledge of the world would be impossible even conventionally.
After showing the inadequacy of all four alternatives, Nāgārjuna posits that any substantialist view of cause and effect must be wrong. Rather than seeing causes and effects as independent, they must be seen as mutually interdependent, both notionally and existentially. That is to say, just as effects depend on their causes to exist, the very property of being a cause existentially depends on the property of it having effects (i.e. its existence as a cause depends on its effects, see MMK 4.3). Further, causes and conditions also depend on living beings and their concepts about the world, for it is living beings who cognitively carve up the world into things and their relations. Indeed, this notional and conceptual kind of dependence is seen as one of the most important dimensions of emptiness, since a common view of Mahayana is that all things are in some sense conceptual constructions (prajñapti).
Westerhoff observes that while causal relations imply lack of svabhāva in some way, Nāgārjuna's argument cannot stop there. After all, Ābhidharmikas saw no conflict between causation and svabhāva, and the dependence of effects upon causes does not necessarily mean that causation itself is a conceptual construction, i.e. it may still exist independently of human cognition. Therefore, for Nāgārjuna, the most profound understanding of emptiness is not merely that cause and effect are dependent on each other, but more importantly, that they are not independent of human cognition and conceptualization. As Westerhoff explains, "since the causal relation does not exist from its own side, is conceptually constructed, and therefore empty, each causally related object must be so constructed and therefore empty in the most profound sense of being conceptually constructed."
At the same time, rather than seeing emptiness as being a kind of nihilism which rejects that an
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate
All is possible when emptiness is possible.
Another major philosophical topic which Nāgārjuna discusses is how to assess the proper instruments of epistemology, or the means of knowledge (Sanskrit: pramāṇa). This was a key topic in the philosophy of his time, and a major theme discussed by the non-buddhist Nyāya school. As with Nyāya thinkers, Nāgārjuna discusses four epistemic instruments: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy or comparison (upamāna), and reliable testimony (āgama), which are held to be able to establish the existence of epistemic objects (prameyas). His main concern is how any set of epistemic instruments can be established or grounded. That is to say, how do we know that any epistemic instrument is a good guide for the existence of things in the world?
In Indian thought, there were various theories of how to ground epistemic instruments or pramāṇas. One view was that they were established by mutual coherence. Nāgārjuna does not spend much time assaulting this view, since his Nyāya opponents generally rejected it on the grounds that stories and fairy tales could be coherent while also being false. The second view is that pramāṇas are self-justified, or grounded in themselves, a view which avoids epistemic infinite regresses. Nāgārjuna argues against this view by pointing out that if this was true, a pramāṇa like visual perception could exist independently of all visual objects. But if this were the case, then it would be able to perceive itself, functioning as its own object (for without an object, it would not be perception at all). But this leads to a problem: as with motion, perception takes time. Thus, "vision cannot see something that exists simultaneously with it (such as itself), since vision takes time too" (as per MMK 3:2–3).
Nāgārjuna further argues that if pramāṇas were self-grounding, we would have no way to choose valid pramāṇas among the various possible means of knowledge. For example, if we were offered five different types of cameras, the only way to truly know if they were accurate instruments of photography would be to test them by photographing various objects. In the same way, pramāṇas cannot be assessed and established independently of their epistemic objects (prameya).
The final position that Nāgārjuna deconstructs is that pramāṇas and prameyas establish each other. In this view, epistemic instruments establish an object and grant us knowledge of it. In turn, the objects establish the instruments via our interactions with them and our assessment of success in our pragmatic goals. The problem with this is that it creates a vicious circle of justification; we would need previous access to the object before accepting that it can establish our visual perception, and this access can only be granted by the epistemic instrument we seek to ground.
One issue with this view however is that now we need an epistemic instrument that grounds epistemic success in the first place, as we could have always been having hallucinations. A further problem is that this does not provide an account of epistemic instruments where pramāṇas exist substantially, with an inherent nature. The entire project becomes an epistemic regress where every element requires further grounding, and none of these elements seem to be able to have any svabhāva or independent existence of their own, even if they can be assessed as being pragmatically useful.
Nāgārjuna’s epistemology is a key part of his theory of emptiness. For Nāgārjuna, nothing can be an epistemic instrument or object intrinsically. As Westerhoff explains, "the two have to be mutually established: the instrument establishes the object by giving us cognitive access to it, our successful interaction with the object establishes the instrument as a trustworthy route to the object." As such, epistemic instruments and objects are not so due to any intrinsic natures, but due to a relative process of conceptual construction. Since pramāṇas and prameyas mutually
Two truths
Nāgārjuna was also instrumental in the development of the two truths doctrine, which claims that there are two levels of truth in Buddhist teaching: the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya) and the conventional or superficial truth (saṃvṛtisatya). As Nāgārjuna writes in the twenty-fourth chapter of the MMK:
The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth.
Who do not know the distinction between the two truths, they do not understand reality in accordance with the profound teachings of the Buddha.
The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customary ways of talking and thinking. Not having acquired the ultimate truth, nirvana is not attained.
For Nāgārjuna, the ultimate truth is the fact that everything is empty, and this includes emptiness itself ("the emptiness of emptiness"). While some have interpreted this by positing Nāgārjuna as a neo-Kantian—making ultimate truth a metaphysical noumenon that transcends reason—the more traditional and standard interpretation held by many modern scholars is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth." Under this "semantic anti-dualist" view, there are only conventional truths.
As Jay L. Garfield explains, if we analyze a conventional entity like a table, we find it is empty because it has no existence apart from its parts. If we then analyze that emptiness, we find nothing but the table's lack of inherent existence. To see the table as empty is simply to see it as conventional and dependent.
Thus, when we understand the ultimate truth, "all one is left with is conventional truth," which is based on commonly accepted practices, language, and concepts. While these conventions veil reality, there is no other way of perceiving the world, as these very processes generate our idea of a "world" in the first place. These are "useful fictions"; a Madhyamaka anti-realist would never accept that these truths are grounded in a world independent of our concepts and cognition.
Where does this leave emptiness?
Emptiness should never be seen as a foundation or an ultimate account of things independent of human conventions. Its purpose is to dissolve our conceptual impositions of svabhāva on phenomena. This absence of svabhāva has no existence of its own; it is merely a corrective to wrong views. Once it has dissolved those views, it dissolves itself. Nāgārjuna warns that seeing emptiness as an ultimate metaphysical reality is dangerous, "like a serpent wrongly held or a spell wrongly executed."
In articulating this doctrine, Nāgārjuna draws on early Buddhist sources to distinguish between definitive meaning (nītārtha) and interpretable meaning (neyārtha), maintaining a "middle" path between the extremes of existence and non-existence.
Ethics
Nāgārjuna and his pupil Aryadeva, Buddhavanam Stupa Drum Reliefs, Telangana.
While Nāgārjuna is most well-known for his philosophical theories, he also wrote numerous religious works, like the Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland), Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Good Friend), and Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra (Requisites of Awakening). These texts discuss Mahāyāna Buddhism more broadly and present an overall ethical and religious framework in which ethics and faith are paramount.
Nāgārjuna's religious ethics focus on the bodhisattva path, the religious path of those who have set out to attain Buddhahood for the sake of all beings.
The Ratnāvalī discusses ethics mainly from the point of view of a layperson, promoting classic Mahāyāna Buddhist virtues like generosity, non-harming, and the six perfections (pāramitās). In this work, he makes a crucial distinction between two dimensions or aspects of the Dharma:
The Dharma of ascendance (abhyudaya, "rising up," success, prosperity): This refers to all the ways to gain happiness and good rebirths through ethical conduct and merit.
The Dharma of transcendence or the Supreme Good (naiḥśreyasa): This he glosses as liberation (moksha) obtained through wisdom and the realization of emptiness.
These two aspects have a close hierarchical relationship, as the practice of the first (ethical conduct) provides the stable foundation necessary to achieve the second (liberation), as Nāgārjuna explains in the beginning of the Ratnāvalī.
Nāgārjuna continues, associating faith with the path of ascendance and wisdom with the path of the Supreme Good:
Here we maintain that ascendance is happiness (sukha), and the highest good is liberation (moksha). In brief, faith and wisdom are the concise method for attaining them.
Through faith one partakes of the Dharma; through wisdom, one truly understands. Of these two, wisdom is foremost, yet faith is its prerequisite.
Thus, while much of Nāgārjuna's writings focus on the wisdom aspect—understanding the doctrine of emptiness and dependent arising—he remains a religious writer for whom faith and ethics are central to the graduated path of the bodhisattva. It is through faith (śraddhā) in the Dharma that one is led to perform acts of virtue and gain merit (puṇya). This, in turn, leads to good rebirths and the necessary conditions for cultivating wisdom (prajñā), such as health and access to teachings.
The Dharma of ascendance functions on the level of conventional truth, while the Dharma of transcendence relates to the ultimate truth of emptiness. Nāgārjuna links these to the two accumulations:
Accumulation of Merit (puṇya-saṃbhāra)
Accumulation of Knowledge/Wisdom (jñāna-saṃbhāra)
The Ratnāvalī oscillates between these two topics, showing how they work together within the Mahāyāna framework.
An Ethics of Emptiness Nāgārjuna's ethical teachings follow standard formulations like the ten wholesome actions, but they are unique in how they are grounded in emptiness. This "eirenic ethics" (ethics of peace) is actually groundless, as it seeks to do away with all metaphysical foundations and rigid "views."
For Nāgārjuna, emptiness is uniquely suited for universal compassion because it dissolves the conceptual division between "self" and "other," abandoning the possibility of selfishness. Virtuous actions are seen as skillful means (upaya) that lead to nirvana—a state where karma is ceased. Much like his metaphysics, his ethical system ultimately dissolves itself: compassionate actions unravel the cycle of craving and attachment, just as the wisdom of emptiness unravels all views.
Relativity
Nāgārjuna also taught the idea of relativity; in the Ratnāvalī, he gives the example that shortness exists only in relation to the idea of length. The determination of a thing or object is only poss
This idea is also found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, in which the idea of relativity is expressed similarly: "That which is the element of light... is seen to exist on account of [in relation to] darkness; that which is the element of good is seen to exist on account of bad; that which is the element of space is seen to exist on account of form."
Buddhahood and nirvana
The bulk of Nāgārjuna's writings dis
As such, chapter twenty-two of the MMK begins by subjecting the Buddha to the same examination that the emptiness of the person was analysed with. By showing that the Buddha is neither identical with the five aggregates (body, feelings, perceptions, intentions, consciousness) nor distinct from them, and that the aggregates are not in the Buddha, nor is he in them, we can see that there is ultimately no Buddha. The Buddha is dependent on the aggregates, which are themselves empty and dependently arisen, thus Buddha is empty of any substantial existence, having the same status as any other phenomena. Thus, according to Nāgārjuna, "The Tathagata is devoid of intrinsic nature; this world is devoid of intrinsic nature." Ultimately, the Buddha is also beyond all conceptualisations and linguistic distinctions; thus, we cannot describe the Buddha as eternal, non-eternal, as both or neither.
As with the Buddha, so with nirvana, the supreme goal of Buddhism. Thus, in chapter twenty-five of the MMK, Nāgārjuna analyses nirvana to show that it cannot have svabhāva. He further argues that nirvana cannot be accurately described with any statement that could apply ultimately, stating that nirvana is neither an existent (bhāva), a non-existence (abhāva), both or neither.
Nirvana cannot be an existent thing because then it would be dependent and conditioned, and nirvana is always described as unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).
Nirvana also cannot be non-existent because then it would also be dependent, since absences depend on existence; they are defined by what they are not.
Once he has rejected all possible views on the ontological status of nirvana, Nāgārjuna affirms that the status of the Buddha after death is an indeterminate question (avyakrta), relying on a classic Buddhist category.
The Non-Duality of Samsara and Nirvana
Finally, in this nirvana chapter, Nāgārjuna also applies the same logic to the realm of suffering itself, samsara, arguing that the ultimate ontological status of both samsara and nirvana are equal in a famous passage (ch. 22, verses 19-20):
There is no distinction whatsoever between samsara and nirvana. There is no distinction whatsoever between nirvana and samsara. What is the limit of nirvana, that is the limit of samsara. There is not even the finest gap to be found between the two.
Thus one cannot say that samsara and nirvana exist in some ultimate sense. Likewise we cannot say they do not exist, nor can we affirm nor reject both positions either. At this point, we reach of apophatic peace in which nothing can be said and our need to conceptualise everything stops (prapañca). Nāgārjuna closes with the following key verse:
This stopping of cognising everything, of prapañca, is blissful. No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone.
Pure Land teaching
Nāgārjuna caps the Suhṛllekha with a dedication of merit towards rebirth in higher realms, ultimately towards birth in Amitābha Buddha's Sukhavati pure land: "May you be born in a buddhafield, freed from illness, old age, attachment, and hatred, and may you become equal to Amitāyus, Protector of Worlds, with the Bhagavān Amitābha" (Verse 122).
Further details of this pure land rebirth ideal are discussed in other sources attributed to Nāgārjuna, especially the Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Stages (Dasabhumika-vibhāsā). This text is an important work in East Asian Pure Land Buddhism, where it is seen as a foundational treatise establishing the distinction between the "easy" path and the "difficult" path. In the “Chapter on Easy Practice,” Nāgārjuna explains how relying on Amitābha Buddha to attain birth in the pure land of Sukhavati can be an "easy" method for attaining non-retrogression on the bodhisattva path.
According to Nāgārjuna, a pure land (viśuddha-buddhakṣetra) is a realm of purification (vyavadāna) where there are no impurities—including wrong views, conceptual proliferation (prapañca), and the impurity of karma—and where instead there is the pure wisdom of emptiness. Other qualities of the pure lands include:
Rapid achievement of realization for bodhisattvas.
The absence of demonic maras.
The presence of immeasurable radiance which heals all suffering and affliction.
Nāgārjuna also explains that upon being born in a pure land, beings become immediately able to dwell on the "ground of irreversibility" (avaivartika). This occurs because seeing the body of a buddha fills their minds with joy and allows them to acquire a specific samādhi that leads to a penetrating understanding of the true character of all dharmas. He also mentions that beings can enter this stage of certainty simply by hearing the name of a buddha, aided by the "original vow" of that buddha.
In its influential ninth chapter, the Dasabhumika compares the paths of practice to modes of travel:
There are innumerable gates to the buddha-dharma. Just as there are difficult and easy paths in this world, going over land being wearying while taking a boat over water is pleasant, just so are the bodhisattva paths.
The Treatise then discusses various buddhas and teaches the practice of r
Comparative philosophy
Hinduism
Nāgārjuna was fully acquainted with the classical Hindu philosophies of Samkhya, Nyaya, and Vaisheshika. He assumed a deep knowledge of the sixteen categories defined in the Nyaya Sutras and even authored a treatise on the pramanas (means of knowledge) where he reduced the traditional five-member syllogism into a three-member version. In the Vigrahavyavartani, Nāgārjuna famously critiqued the Nyaya theory of knowledge, challenging their foundational epistemology.
Buddhism
Nāgārjuna was conversant with both the scholasticism of non-Mahayana Abhidharma schools and the Mahāyāna sutratradition. His arguments frequently target the realist positions of the Sarvastivada Vaibhāṣika school. While some scholars suggest he may have been associated with the Mahāsāṃghikas, determining a specific sectarian affiliation is difficult, as his texts focus on universal Buddhist principles rather than sect-specific doctrines.
If the attributions by scholars like Christian Lindtner are correct, Nāgārjuna was clearly a Mahāyānist, yet his work remains deeply rooted in the Sanskrit Āgamas (Śrāvaka texts). He viewed the Buddha not just as a predecessor but as the founder of the Madhyamaka system. Some scholars even see him as a successor to Moggaliputta-Tissa, reviving the original "middle-way" ideals of the Buddha.
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